Made to measure? An analysis of the transition from Disability Living Allowance to Personal Independence Payment by MACHIN, Richard
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjsf20
Download by: [Staffordshire University], [Richard MACHIN] Date: 26 October 2017, At: 13:29
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law
ISSN: 0964-9069 (Print) 1469-9621 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjsf20
Made to measure? An analysis of the transition
from Disability Living Allowance to Personal
Independence Payment
Richard Machin
To cite this article: Richard Machin (2017): Made to measure? An analysis of the transition from
Disability Living Allowance to Personal Independence Payment, Journal of Social Welfare and
Family Law, DOI: 10.1080/09649069.2017.1390291
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2017.1390291
Published online: 24 Oct 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Journal of Social Welfare and family laW, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2017.1390291
GENERAL SECTION
Made to measure? An analysis of the transition from Disability 
Living Allowance to Personal Independence Payment
Richard Machin
Social Welfare law, Policy and advice Practice, Staffordshire university, Stoke-on-Trent, uK
ABSTRACT
As part of the government’s programme of welfare reform Personal 
Independence Payment (PIP) is replacing Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA) for people of working age. This will have a significant impact on 
a wide range of disability benefit claimants. This article examines the 
government’s rationale for replacing DLA with PIP, the key technical 
differences between the two benefits and the role that disability 
benefits can play in reducing poverty. The introduction of PIP has 
led to considerable debate in the social welfare law sector about the 
scope, purpose and assessment of social security benefits for the 
disabled. These issues are explored with reference to the first Gray 
Review of PIP (2014) and the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities Inquiry (2016) into the impact of the UK 
Government’s policies on disabled people.
Introduction
The Welfare Reform Act (WRA) 2012 (sections 77 to 95) provides the legislative framework 
for Personal Independence Payment (PIP). PIP is replacing Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA) for claimants of working age and is intended to assist with costs associated with disa-
bility or long-term health conditions. Like DLA, PIP is a non-means tested and non-taxable 
benefit with two components: a mobility component based on the claimant’s ability to get 
around, and the daily living component based on the ability to perform a range of daily living 
activities (sections 78 and 79 WRA). Entitlement is based on an individual assessment by 
an approved health care professional and all awards are subject to periodic review. PIP was 
introduced for new claimants from April 2013, and by 2018 it is expected that all existing 
DLA claimants will be reassessed for PIP (Kennedy, 2015).
Given the relatively short history of PIP there is a lack of systematic analysis of the 
impact of this disability benefit, although much has been written and debated in the press 
and amongst politicians, practitioners and claimants. The first part of this article analyses 
the government’s rationale for replacing DLA with PIP, examines the technical differences 
between the two benefits and considers the impact on a range of claimants. The second 
section of the article focuses on the scope of the first Gray Review of PIP (Gray, 2014). The 
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2   R. MACHIN
Review was a requirement of the WRA 2012 and the terms of reference and limitations 
of this report will be analysed. The article analyses in detail three key areas considered 
by the Gray Review which are central to an analysis of the transition from DLA to PIP: 
the claimant experience; the collection of evidence; and assuring fairness and consistency. 
Attention is given to the fragile balance between the public purse and the needs of disa-
bled claimants. In July 2016, a call for evidence for the second Gray Review of PIP was 
published (DWP, 2012a). This consultation is now closed with the findings of the second 
review expected to be published in 2017. The final part of the article analyses the findings 
of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Inquiry into the impact 
of government policy on disabled people. The Inquiry examined the cumulative impact of 
legislation and policies adopted by the government on social security schemes, work and 
employment. This article focuses on the Committee’s recommendations in relation to PIP 
and the government’s response to the report. In rejecting the findings of the report, the 
UK Government has restated its commitment to supporting disabled people. The article 
will examine the government’s defence of their record in relation to disability benefits and 
explore the ways in which the media has both reported and influenced public opinion on 
social security benefits such as PIP.
The transition from DLA to PIP
DLA was introduced in 1992 replacing Attendance Allowance and Mobility Allowance for 
children and adults under the age of 65 (Henry, 2014). There are striking similarities between 
the aims of the Conservative government of 1992 in introducing DLA and the intentions 
of the coalition government and their welfare reform programme implemented 20 years 
later through the WRA of 2012. A key objective of the 1992 reform of disability benefits 
was to better target funds to disabled claimants in most need (Daly & Noble, 1996). The 
Department for Social Security (1990 recognised that change was needed to improve the 
structure of benefits for disabled people thus making it more attuned to their needs, echoing 
the sentiment of the equality impact assessment for PIP with a focus on supporting those 
with greatest need to lead full and independent lives.
A key feature of DLA was a move to a self-assessment model (largely welcomed by both 
claimants and their representatives) with claimants describing the impact of their disability 
or health problems on a claim form running to over 40 pages. It was hoped that this would 
reduce the need for formal medical examinations with adjudication officers being able to 
determine entitlement on the basis of clear evidence from claimants, supported where 
necessary with evidence from a GP or consultant. The parallels between the introduction of 
DLA and PIP do not end with the political aims of the previous administration; problems 
with delays in decision-making are a feature of both benefits. The House of Commons Social 
Security Committee (1993) reported a significant backlog of DLA claims citing unfamiliarity 
with the new assessment criteria and the sheer volume of claims as contributing factors.
From 1992 until the introduction of PIP, DLA was the main disability benefit for claim-
ants of working age. Under DLA, there was an emphasis on ‘disablement’ or ‘severe disable-
ment’ (sections 72 and 73 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992). From 
April 2013, no new DLA claims have been accepted from adults of working age (hence the 
eligibility criteria are described in the past tense below) who must now claim PIP, although 
children under the age of 16 can still make applications. As we will see, the tests for PIP 
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are quite different and refer to the extent to which a person’s physical or mental condition 
leads to a ‘limited ability’ to carry out a range of daily living or mobility activities. DLA had 
two components – care and mobility. The care component was payable at three different 
rates (high, middle and low) and the mobility component was paid at two rates (high and 
low). In order to qualify for the care component of DLA claimants needed to show that 
they needed attention with bodily functions or had supervision needs. The leading case 
on attention needs (Mallinson v Secretary of State for Social Security [1994], reported as 
R(A) 3/94) clarified that attention is in connection with a bodily function if it provides a 
substitute method of providing what the bodily function would provide if it were not totally 
or partially impaired. Attention involved personal contact from another person and was, 
therefore, active in nature. Alternatively, a claimant satisfied the supervision needs test 
if they needed more passive assistance (precautionary or anticipatory) in order to avoid 
substantial danger to themselves or others (section 72 (1) (b) Social Security Contribution 
and Benefits Act (SSCBA) 1992). The reality of disabled claimants’ lives meant that it was 
often difficult to accurately distinguish between attention and supervision needs and there 
was often overlap between the two tests.
DLA made a distinction between attention and supervision needs during the day and 
night with the high rate of the care component being awarded to those claimants who had 
either attention or supervision needs during the day and night and the middle rate for those 
claimants who needed attention or supervision during the day or night. The low rate of the 
care component picked up those claimants who needed attention for short periods during 
the day (known as a significant portion) and those who passed a theoretical test (commonly 
referred to as the ‘cooking test’) and could not through either physical or mental disability 
prepare a cooked main meal.
Eligibility for the high rate of the mobility component was reserved for claimants who 
were unable to walk or ‘virtually unable to walk’. Arguably the test of virtual inability to 
walk was the most difficult for claimants, advisors and adjudication officers to assess and 
a very significant body of case law has amassed over the years in relation to this test. No 
distance was specified in the primary legislation but for professionals in the social welfare 
law sector 50 metres was considered to be the cut of point beyond which claims would 
normally fail (commissioner’s decisions CDLA/608/1994 and CDLA/14594/1996 provide 
useful commentary on this issue). In order to qualify for the lower rate of the mobility 
component, claimants needed to prove that they were so severely disabled that they could 
not mobilise outdoors in unfamiliar places without guidance or supervision from another 
person most of the time (section 73 (1) (d) SSCBA 1992). Unlike the high rate of the mobility 
component, which was aimed at claimants with physical health problems, the low rate of 
the mobility component was designed for claimants with mental health problems, sensory 
impairments or a learning disability.
The transition from DLA to PIP is underpinned by a change in perspective on who should 
qualify for working age disability benefits. The DWP stated (DWP, 2012a) that this change 
in philosophy was required as many DLA decisions were being made without reference to 
medical evidence and eligibility sometimes focused on the nature of a claimant’s condition 
rather than the impact of the condition. Additionally, a perception existed that DLA is for 
claimants who cannot work, although the regulations allow for claimants to be in or out of 
work (DWP, 2012a). The DWP were aware that just over two-thirds of DLA claimants had 
an indefinite award of benefit (DWP, 2012a) and had a desire to introduce a system where 
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4   R. MACHIN
there is a clear facility to regularly review awards (there are striking parallels with the Labour 
government’s rationale for replacing Incapacity Benefit with Employment and Support 
Allowance in 2008). The change in emphasis from the DLA language of ‘disablement’ and 
‘severe disablement’ to the PIP terminology of ‘limited ability’ to carry out daily living or 
mobility activities consolidates this dominant change in philosophy that has pervaded the 
provision of welfare benefits for nearly a decade. Critics of this shift (Baumberg, Warren, 
Garthwaite, & Bambra, 2015) have suggested that assessment of out of work benefits should 
be based on a ‘real world -assessment’ of claimant’s health problems and cite the Netherlands 
and US as examples of countries where sophisticated databases of functional impairment 
are used to assess entitlement to benefit. This seems a distant prospect given the DWP’s 
assertion in the PIP equality impact assessment that measuring each individual’s expenditure 
would be administratively complex and expensive (DWP, 2012a).
There remain two components under PIP – a daily living and a mobility component 
(section 77 (2) Welfare Reform Act 2012) – and a claimant may be awarded either or both 
of these components. Each of these components has two rates: a limited ability to carry 
out daily living or mobility activities results in an award of the standard rate; and a severely 
limited ability attracts an award of the enhanced rate. The DLA process of self-assessment 
is replaced with a points-based system assessed by a formal medical. The standard rate 
of either component is awarded if a claimant is awarded a minimum of 8 points and the 
enhanced rate is awarded if the claimant is awarded over 12 points.
The attention needs and/or supervision requirements under DLA have been replaced with 
a set of 10 different daily living activities. Under each activity, there are a set of descriptors 
(or options) which represent varying degrees of ability. Different points are available for each 
of the descriptors (ranging from 0 to 12), the highest points from each of the descriptors 
that apply can be added together to give the claimant an overall score. Some claimants will 
be awarded PIP on the basis of a score of at least eight points from one descriptor while 
other claimants will aggregate scores from a range of descriptors to reach the required 
threshold. The ‘cooking test’ which gave rise to the low rate of the care component has been 
preserved as daily living activity 1, although as discussed below it is not a straightforward 
replication of the DLA test.
The limited ability to walk or the need for guidance/supervision outdoors of the DLA 
mobility component have been replaced under PIP with two mobility activities. Activity 1 
considers the ability to plan and follow journeys (and has some similarities with DLA lower 
rate mobility) and activity 2 considers the ability to move around (and has some similarities 
with DLA high rate mobility).
For a descriptor to apply under either the daily living or mobility component a claimant 
must be able to complete the activity ‘safely, to an acceptable standard, repeatedly and within 
a reasonable time period’ (Regulation2 – Social Security (PIP) (Amendment) Regulations 
2013). A reasonable period of time is no more than twice as long as it would take an 
individual without disabilities to complete an activity. Unlike DLA, PIP does not make a 
distinction between day and night time needs and the default position is to make awards 
for a fixed period, although indefinite awards can be still be made.
Some of the key technical differences in the eligibility criteria between DLA and PIP and 
an analysis of those claimants who are likely to benefit or be disadvantaged by the transition 
is analysed below: First, claimants who received the low rate of the mobility component of 
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DLA on the basis of needing guidance or supervision when outdoors in unfamiliar areas 
may benefit from being recognised under activity 1 of the PIP mobility activities (planning 
and following journeys). This could lead to an entitlement of the enhanced rate of PIP on 
the basis of satisfying the 12-point descriptor under this activity ‘cannot follow the route 
of a familiar journey without another person, an assistance dog or an orientation aid’. The 
risk for this group of DLA claimants is that they will miss out entirely on an award of the 
PIP mobility component if they are only judged to need prompting to complete a journey 
to avoid overwhelming psychological distress as this only brings an award of four points. 
There is already an emerging body of case law in relation to this issue. In DA v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKUT 344 (ACC) Judge Jacobs supports a restrictive 
interpretation of this descriptor holding that it is irrelevant to consider help to overcome 
anxiety caused by other people and crowds. A broader interpretation is found in MH v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2016] UKUT 0531(AAC), which held that 
following a journey includes an ability to make progress and navigation. Second, DLA high 
rate mobility claimants can be identified as potential losers. The ‘unwritten rule’ with DLA 
that an inability to walk more than 50 m would lead to entitlement to the high rate of the 
mobility component has been removed. In order to qualify for the enhanced rate of the 
mobility component of PIP a claimant needs to prove that they can walk 20 metres or less. In 
July 2014, the High Court intervened on this issue dismissing a judicial review brought by a 
claimant who argued that the consultation in relation to the mobility activity was unlawful 
as it did not make explicit reference to the new 20 metre rule. Mr Justice Hickinbottom held 
that while the consultation had been ‘mind-bogglingly opaque’ it was not unlawful (Sumpter 
v the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWHC 2434 (Admin).
Third, claimants who need assistance with budgeting may benefit from the introduction 
of PIP. Daily living activity 10 has 3 descriptors which attract points for problems ‘making 
budgeting decisions’. It has been suggested that claimants who have an appointee to manage 
the administration of their benefits should be awarded six points under this new descriptor 
(Henry, 2014).
Similarly, claimants who require aids and appliances now have this taken into account 
under PIP. Under DLA, many claimants perceived an unfairness that a reliance on aids 
and appliances could make an award less likely as this could be interpreted as evidence 
that the aid/appliance had removed the need for attention. Under PIP seven of the daily 
living activities (preparing food, taking nutrition, washing and bathing, managing toilet 
needs, dressing and undressing, communicating verbally, reading and understanding signs/
symbols/words) include descriptors relating to the use of aids and appliances which attract 
two points, with a further descriptor allowing one point (managing therapy).
Fourth, regulation 17 of the PIP (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2013 provides that 
for those claimants who are transferring from DLA to PIP, the award of DLA continues for 
28 days following the affirmative decision to award PIP. This will work to the advantage of 
claimants who will see a reduction in their entitlement when they move to PIP, but delay 
an increase in award where the reverse is the case.
A fifth concern is that claimants who have difficulty preparing a cooked main meal (pre-
viously covered by the low rate mobility of DLA under the ‘cooking test’) may have their 
award preserved under activity 1 of PIP daily living activities. Eight points are awarded 
under this descriptor for those who ‘cannot prepare and cook food’. However, claimants 
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6   R. MACHIN
with mental health problems who lack motivation to cook may miss out as the descriptor 
‘Needs prompting to be able to either prepare or cook a main meal’ attracts only two points.
Sixth, those claimants who previously received the middle rate of the care component 
of DLA on the basis of day-time attention needs may see an increase in an award of PIP 
to the enhanced rate of the daily living component (which makes no distinction between 
night-time and day-time needs)
Moreover, claimants entitled to the middle rate of DLA on basis of requiring supervision 
by day or watching over at night may find it difficult to secure a comparable award of PIP. 
Five of the PIP daily living activities include descriptors for supervision (preparing food, 
taking nutrition, managing therapy or monitoring a health condition, washing and bathing 
and managing toilet needs or incontinence). However, the majority of these descriptors 
attract only two points. This could have a particularly negative impact on claimants with 
mental health problems.
The Gray review of the PIP assessment
The WRA 2012 (section 89) requires the Secretary of State to commission two independ-
ent reviews of the effectiveness of the PIP assessment process. In 2014, Paul Gray was 
appointed as independent reviewer of the PIP assessment. An independent scrutiny group 
was appointed with five representatives from a range of backgrounds including academia 
and disability organisations. The review used a mixed methodology approach to gather 
evidence. This included a review of social security statistics, a call for evidence (which 
received over 800 responses), interviews with claimants and staff from the DWP, meetings 
with ATOS and Capita (the contracted assessment providers) and an interview with a 
Regional Tribunal Judge.
In the foreword to the review, Gray acknowledged the challenges associated with the 
adjudication process for a disability benefit stating that ‘functional assessment is not a precise 
science’ (Gray, 2014, p. 2). He alluded to a complex range of factors including physiological, 
psychological, motivational and social, that impact on a claimant’s daily life. To emphasise 
the enormity of the task he highlighted not only that the design of PIP is being undertaken 
against the backdrop of austerity, but also that few other counties attempt a similar system 
where entitlement is based on an individual assessment of disability. Without question, 
attempting to reform the disability benefits system at the same time as making signifi-
cant savings to the social security budget is challenging. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2014) states that in an economic recession social 
spending-to-GDP ratios normally increase as government spending rises to meet a greater 
need for social support. However, the UK is in a minority of OECD countries which have 
responded to the economic downturn by reducing social spending as a ratio of GDP. This 
balance between rationalising public spending and protecting and promoting the rights of 
disabled citizens has been described by Jordan (2006, p. 40) as ‘optimum security’ which 
‘involves looking at what measures can give people opportunities to develop their capabil-
ities, while leaving them free to take up these opportunities in their own way.’
The Gray review made recommendations in three main areas: improving the claimant 
experience, improving the collection of further evidence and assuring the fairness and 
consistency of the assessment.
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Improving the claimant experience
When considering the claimant experience, the Gray review focused on the claimant journey 
from the initial claim through to decision-making. The principal concerns identified were 
that communication with claimants is often inconsistent, advice provided to claimants can 
be incomplete, communication between the DWP and contracted assessment providers is 
disjointed and that significant improvements need to be made to DWP case management 
systems.
Without doubt the most publicised criticism of PIP has been the delays in decision-mak-
ing. The Review reported (p. 32) that many claimants feel that delays in the assessment 
process lead not only to anxiety but also a deterioration in the health condition for which 
they are claiming benefit. Concerns were expressed that the two-stage claims process (an 
initial telephone call to the DWP, followed by the completion of a paper-based form) con-
tributes to delays. It was reported that the first stage of this process could be particularly 
problematic for claimants with mental health problems, hearing difficulties or learning 
disabilities. Advice agencies (notably Mencap and Parkinson’s UK) reported difficulties 
when contacting the DWP to support claimants. This is despite ‘implicit consent arrange-
ments’ which should allow trusted intermediaries to liaise with the DWP (2009). Evidence 
provided on the paper form itself was mixed, with some respondents believing it to be an 
improvement on the previous DLA form but many expressing concern that a one-month 
deadline to return the form is too short.
In relation to the significant problem of delays, Gray made a long-term recommendation 
that an improved operating model is required which utilises digital technology, moves away 
from a ‘one size fits all’ approach and allows claimants to track the status of their claim. In 
accepting this recommendation, the government state that they have developed an improved 
PIP digital claim which streamlines the previously disjointed process and keeps claimants 
(and/or their representatives) informed of progress through SMS texting.
Given that there is no legal requirement for the DWP to make a PIP entitlement decision 
within a specified time Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) have suggested that claim-
ant representatives should consider pursuing a formal complaint to the DWP (and the 
assessment provider), pursue a complaint through a member of parliament, or consider a 
judicial review application (Shaw, 2014). Additionally, the DWP’s Special Payment Scheme 
does allow for ex-gratia payments where there is evidence of maladministration, including 
unreasonable delay (DWP, 2012b).
Redress through the courts remains an option for claimants experiencing the type of 
delays identified by the Gray Review. In C & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions & Anor [2015] EWHC 1607 (Admin) it was held that delays 
in the PIP decision-making process were unacceptable and unlawful. The two claimants 
challenged the legality of the processing of PIP arguing that it breached the duty on the part 
of the defendant to act within a reasonable time, and breached Article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the European Convention of Human Rights (right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions) 
and Article 6 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). In handing down her judgement, Mrs Justice Patterson found 
that the claimant’s human rights had not been breached but the delays in the determina-
tion of benefit entitlement (13 months for the first claimant and 10 months for the second 
claimant) were unlawful. She acknowledged the challenges associated with the roll-out of 
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8   R. MACHIN
PIP, however, and the administrative and processing delays in the cases of C and W were 
found to be so significant that they inhibited the ability of vulnerable claimants to access 
payment. Whilst the significance of this decision should not be downplayed Mrs Justice 
Patterson made it clear that the claimants’ cases should not be treated as test cases.
Improving the collection of further evidence
The Gray Review emphasised the importance of the collection of further evidence to ensure 
accurate and timely decisions are made. Further evidence can be collected from a wide 
range of parties (for example claimants, GPs, consultants, social care professionals) and 
starts when a claimant makes initial telephone contact with the DWP.
One of the Review’s main recommendations in this area was that evidence/information 
held elsewhere should be used for the PIP assessment process (subject to appropriate data 
protection protocols). The most obvious example of this is to consider evidence held by 
the DWP in relation to another benefit claim (e.g. Employment and Support Allowance) 
but could extend more broadly to information held by other parts of the public sector. This 
theme was prominent in the call for evidence with some claimants expressing confusion as 
to why they were required to attend multiple medical assessments for more than one benefit 
when they appeared to deal with similar issues.
Perhaps unsurprisingly the government accepted the Reviews’ recommendations 
in relation to extending the sharing of information, stating that they would explore the 
appropriateness of using information from different DWP assessments. The government 
acknowledged that many disability organisations have concerns about extended data-shar-
ing arrangements, which could lead to reduced entitlements for some claimants. However, 
movement is certainly towards a greater degree of data-sharing as the government consider 
using not only information held by the DWP, but also looking at information gathered by 
social services, and the Department of Health.
These data-sharing considerations are not a new development in the social welfare 
law sector. The appropriateness of data sharing has been an issue for professionals, deci-
sion-makers and judges for many years. The DWP’s internal guidance for decision-makers 
‘Principles of Decision Making and Evidence’ (DWP, 2013) does provide advice which is 
entirely consistent with Gray’s recommendations. It instructs decision-makers to exercise 
a level of caution when considering whether evidence obtained for one benefit should be 
considered as reliable when considering entitlement to other benefits:
DMs should bear in mind that medical reports are produced in order to determine whether 
the person satisfies the conditions of entitlement for a particular benefit and that some of the 
findings might not be relevant to another benefit. For example, where a WCA report is used 
as evidence to disallow an award of ESA or credits, and the decision is overturned on appeal, 
the WCA report may not be a useful source of evidence when deciding a claim for PIP. (par-
agraphs A1570 and A1573)
This issue was the subject of a significant number of decisions by Social Security 
Commissioners when considering appeals brought against DLA claims. Claimants have a 
right of appeal against a decision made by the first-tier tribunal. Before November 2008, 
appeals were made to Social Security Commissioners. Since this date, Social Security 
Commissioners have formed part of the Upper Tribunal which deals with appeals brought 
against a first-tier tribunal on the basis of an error of law. Upper Tribunal decisions dealing 
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with PIP appeals are not bound by previous DLA decisions and, therefore, tell us much about 
the different ways in which disability is now interpreted and assessed. A good example of 
this can be seen in JC v SSWP [2015] UKUT 0144 where it was held that when considering 
the variability of care needs the long-established Moyna test in DLA cases (R(DLA) 7/03) 
has no place in PIP decisions as this issue is now covered by Regulation 7 of the PIP regula-
tions. In Moyna the House of Lords held that the assessment of care needs should involve a 
broad assessment of disability over a period of time. Rejecting this approach for PIP, Judge 
Gamble emphasised that a scoring descriptor applies to claimants where their impairment 
affects their ability to complete an activity on more than 50% of days in a 12-month period.
The PIP Regulations do not appear to make such a clear move away from DLA when it 
comes to further or supporting evidence. Part 2 of the regulations (section 8) sets out the 
‘Information or evidence required for determining limited or severely limited ability to 
carry out activities’. This provision is very general in scope and merely stipulates that the 
claimant must provide information or evidence to the Secretary of State as requested within 
a reasonable period of time (usually within one month). It follows that previous DLA Upper 
Tribunal decisions in relation to data sharing and provision of evidence remain apposite. 
Upper Tribunals (see for example CDLA/5803/1999*) generally found that information 
from incapacity benefit/employment support allowance medicals could be used for DLA 
purposes providing the evidence was ‘properly comparable’. CDLA/2710/2011 held that 
tribunals should take a consistent approach when considering evidence from other benefits 
and CDLA/3896/2006 emphasised the dangers in extrapolating evidence obtained for one 
disability benefit and applying it to the eligibility criteria for another. The submissions to 
the Gray Review, by both advice agencies and claimants, illustrated a lack of consensus on 
the appropriateness of data-sharing; it remains open to debate whether the availability of 
increased evidence leads to fairer or more accurate decision-making.
The Gray Review called for clarity about the purpose of PIP face-to-face assessments. 
The Review found that there remains a perception, often by claimants but also by advice 
agencies, that the PIP assessment is a medical rather than an assessment of functional ability 
as laid out in the legislation. This has a significant impact on the collection of further evi-
dence as claimants will often seek medical reports from their GP or consultant. The Gray 
Review recommended also that in the medium-term the DWP should explore opportunities 
to improve the collection of further evidence and provide greater clarity about evidence 
required and who is responsible for gathering the evidence. Decisions-makers reported 
that claimants can sometimes provide large amounts of information which is deemed to 
be irrelevant (e.g. hospital appointment letters) and that this places an unnecessary admin-
istrative burden on staff.
Assuring fairness and consistency of PIP award outcomes
This part of the Gray Review examined some fundamental questions about the extent 
to which PIP can provide appropriate, targeted support for some of the most vulnerable 
people in society, while at the same time delivering value for the money for the tax payer. 
Academics, social welfare law agencies and disability campaigning groups should welcome 
Gray’s recommendation that the DWP should put in place a rigorous quantitative and qual-
itative evaluation strategy, with a particular focus on the appropriateness of PIP assessments 
for people with a learning disability or mental health problem. One such organisation may 
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be the British Psychological Society (BPS, 2016) which following a Channel 4 Dispatches 
programme (Channel 4 Dispatches: The Great Benefits Row, 2016) expressed concern that 
the PIP assessment process adopts a formulaic approach which does not recognise the 
highly individualised nature of mental health problems. Gray drew attention to the limita-
tions in the quality assurance and audit systems used by the DWP, arguing that the process 
of ‘vertical scrutiny’ i.e. an analysis of individual PIP assessments currently used, should 
be complemented by ‘horizontal scrutiny’ which would take a large representative sample 
from across different regions in the county.
This section of the Gray Review made specific recommendations in relation to aids and 
appliances and planning and following journeys. The Review’s evidence on aids (devices 
that help performance of a function, for example walking sticks) and appliances (devices 
that provide or replace a missing function, for example wheelchairs) was used to justify 
the government’s aborted proposals to make significant cuts to the PIP budget. The Review 
stated that there were indications that claimants were being awarded points as part of the 
PIP assessment process for needing aids or appliances, but in reality through choice and 
not medical need claimants are making these purchase themselves, often at a very lost cost. 
This is significant as the awarding of points for requiring aids and appliances can be a key 
determining factor in a claimant meeting the threshold for an award of PIP. The Review 
recommended that the government review how aids and appliances are accounted for in 
the assessment process and consider adjustments to guidance and staff training.
Following public consultation (DWP, 2015), the government decided that the points 
awarded for the need to use aids and appliances in relation to the dressing and undressing 
and managing toilet needs activities in the PIP assessment would be halved from two to 
one. The government’s justification for this decision was twofold. Firstly, it was judged that 
these activities could not be seen as being reasonably associated with extra costs. Secondly, 
following the Gray Review the DWP undertook a case-load review and concluded that many 
of the aids and appliances used by claimants are ‘provided free of charge by the NHS and 
local authorities or can be purchased for a low one-off cost’. (DWP, 2016a, p. 4).
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS, 2016) estimated that 370,000 claimants would be 
affected by these changes to the dressing/undressing and managing toilet needs descriptors, 
either seeing a reduction or loss of award, producing government savings of £4.4 billion 
by 2020-21. The government announced the above changes in the budget of 2016 and 
presumably expected a backlash from disability organisations but were perhaps surprised 
by the level of public opposition. A YouGov poll found 70% of the public believed the cuts 
to PIP for people who need to use aids and appliances were the wrong priority, with only 
13% judging them to be a good idea (YouGov, 2016). In his resignation letter (BBC, 2016) 
following the budget Iain Duncan Smith stated that reductions in PIP ‘are not defensible 
in the way they were placed within a Budget that benefits higher earning taxpayers. They 
should have instead been part of a wider process to engage others in finding the best way 
to better focus resource.’ Less than a week after the budget, the new work and pensions 
Secretary Stephen Crabb announced that the reversal of the proposed cuts (Hansard, 21 
March 2016, col 1268).
The significance of the Gray Review cannot be understated. It should not only be viewed 
as a statutory requirement to audit the adjudication of PIP. It also galvanised claimants and 
campaigning groups who saw this as an opportunity to raise grievances. For the govern-
ment the findings have been used to propose policy changes – although as the resignation 
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of Iain Duncan attests, this is a strategy that comes with some risk. The issues considered 
by the Review will remain of importance in the years ahead as we see the full implications 
of the transition from DLA to PIP for working age claimants. The second Gray review was 
published in March 2017 with a focus on further evidence, data sharing and further scrutiny 
of the claimant experience (Gray 2017).
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
This article has explored the transition from DLA to PIP and the influence of the Gray 
Review. Scrutiny is also being applied to the disability benefits system from outside the 
UK. Campaigning by disability charities, such as Disabled People Against Cuts (DPAC), 
influenced the decision of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to 
conduct an inquiry into the impact of the UK Government’s policies on disabled people 
(Politowski, 2016). Since 2007, the UK has been a signatory to the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Convention is an international 
human rights treaty adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006 and promotes and qual-
ifies the rights of disabled people as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Optional Protocol gives power to the UN Committee to conduct an investigation if 
they have credible evidence of ‘grave and systematic violations of the Convention’ (United 
Nations [UN], 2016). The UK is the first country to be investigated under this Convention. 
The findings in relation to disability benefits (including PIP) are significant, although the 
government has no legal obligation to act upon them.
Background to the inquiry and compliance with Article 28 of the convention
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability confirmed that they started to 
receive information in 2012 which alleged that the government’s social security policy was 
having an adverse impact on disabled people and was affecting the rights enshrined in the 
Convention. In April 2013 the Committee agreed to register the request for an Inquiry and 
the government submitted formal responses to the inquiry on 20 August 2013 and 28 March 
2014. In April 2014 the Committee assessed that there was reliable information indicating 
grave or systematic violations of the Convention. A closed hearing commenced in London 
in October 2015 with the media reporting (Butler, 2016) that the hearing lasted for 11 days 
taking evidence from more than 200 individuals including MPs, activists and academics. 
It is understood that two UN envoys heard additional witness statements in Manchester, 
Bristol, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. The UN published the findings of their 
inquiry (UN, 2016) in October 2016 and the government’s official response was published 
the following month (UK Government, 2016).
In relation to disability benefits the Committee considered the UK Government’s com-
pliance with three specific articles of the Convention: Article 19 (Living independently 
and being included in the community), Article 27 (Work and employment) and Article 28 
(Adequate standard of living and social protection). All three Articles are of significance 
to the administration of disability benefits, but Article 28 has the clearest synergies stating:
This article affirms the rights of persons with disabilities to an adequate standard of living for 
themselves and their family, and to social protection without discrimination on the basis of 
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disability. This right includes access to assistance from the state with disability-related expenses 
for persons with disabilities and their families
Under Article 28, social protection is defined as interventions designed to guarantee basic 
income security such as poverty reduction programmes. Article 28 emphasises the need 
to provide access to mainstream services through the provision of social security bene-
fits which acknowledge disability-related needs and expenses and highlights that disabled 
people are disproportionately affected by poverty and should be meaningfully protected 
by social security systems.
There are well-established links between health inequalities and income inequalities 
(Rowlingson, 2011; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). The Department for Work and Pensions 
argue that PIP will help to ameliorate these inequalities by providing financial support to 
enable disabled people to live more independent and active lives (DWP, 2012a). There are a 
number of significant political and economic factors at play which may limit the likelihood 
of these aims being achieved. The Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission (SMPCP, 
2015) found that people experiencing persistent poverty (having less than 60% of current 
median income for at least three of the previous four years) are often living with a long-term 
disability or illness. DWP statistics for 2013/14 illustrate the reliance that disabled people 
in the UK have on social security benefits. About 83% of families with at least one disabled 
adult in the household were in receipt of state benefits. The reliance on state support is even 
greater where there is a disabled child in the household with 95% of families claiming a state 
benefit (DWP, 2016b). Critics may suggest that as the roll out of PIP is expected to result in 
607,000 fewer claimants than under the previous DLA regime (DWP, 2012a), government 
policy is directly contributing to health and income inequalities.
Compliance with Article 28 requires eligibility criteria for ‘social programmes’ to take into 
the social model of disability and not the medical model ‘addressing the multiple barriers 
that limit the participation of persons with disabilities in society, and not rely on narrowly 
defined medical criteria or medical assessments.’ (UN, 2016, p. 6). The move from DLA to 
PIP was an opportunity for a fundamental revaluation of how the state interprets disability. 
The eligibility criteria for any social security benefit by definition produces a framework 
where claimants are assessed as either ‘included’ or ‘excluded’. The social model of disability 
as developed by Oliver (1983) argues that disability should not be defined by impairment 
but by the disabling barriers created by society. The introduction of DLA was accompanied 
by academic debate about the extent to which this new benefit embraced the social model 
of disability. Noble, Platt, Smith and Daly (1997) argued that the assessment of DLA was 
more closely aligned with the medical model of disability, with disability being viewed as a 
property of the disabled person. The introduction of PIP has introduced many significant 
changes but has done little to reverse the association with the medical model of disability. 
Roulstone (2015, p. 14) believes that it is inappropriate for disability benefit reforms to 
embrace an assessment that focuses on the minutiae of how the body works and argues 
that ‘A social model response would suggest these new formulations are unhelpful and fail 
to account for social barriers’.
The Inquiry emphasised that Article 28 dictates that social security programmes should 
be adapted to the needs of people with disabilities and provide benefits at an adequate level 
for claimants to enjoy an adequate standard of living. Fitzpatrick (2011) emphasises that 
policy-makers have often been reluctant to embrace the social model as it is assumed to be 
associated with high costs. He argues that disabled people have not been served well by the 
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benefit system, which fails to adequately meet the additional costs of disability: ‘If future 
welfare reforms are to be effective, then they must be underpinned by strong and compre-
hensive legislation that emphasizes the social rights of disabled people’ (Fitzpatrick, 2011, p. 
167). Duffy (2014) found that recent government policy has not met the aspirations set out 
by Fitzpatrick with public sector cuts, including welfare reform, reductions in legal aid and 
cuts in local government budgets, resulting in disabled people losing an average of £4,660 
per year (disabled people make up 4% of the population but bear 13% of public sector cuts).
Finally, in relation to Article 28 member states should provide information in relation 
to disability benefits which is accessible, eligibility criteria should be ‘proportionate and 
transparent’ and ‘consultation processes should not be merely symbolic’ (UN, 2016, p. 6).
Findings and recommendations of the Inquiry
The Inquiry made a range of general findings in relation to the government’s welfare reform 
policy. The initial findings provide a commentary on the aims of the government’s welfare 
reform policy and fiscal deficit programme. The government have been explicit in their pol-
icy aims (Kennedy, 2015) and it would appear likely that the government would defend the 
right to make these cuts however unpalatable they are to some sections of the electorate. In 
broad terms the government have a mandate to make significant cuts to the welfare budget, 
although the Conservative Party manifesto pledged to exempt disability and pensioner 
benefits from cuts (Conservative Party, 2015).
A more contested finding of the Inquiry relates not to the aims of welfare reform but to its 
consequences. As we have seen the government asserts that the move from DLA to PIP was 
required to ensure that support is focused on those with greatest need and expenditure was 
placed on a more sustainable footing (DWP, 2012a). However, the Inquiry found there to be 
an inherent contradiction in the aims of these reforms. The pre-implementation assumption 
that a significant percentage of disabled people would no longer rely on disability benefits 
was predicated on the fact that only those with low or moderate needs would be affected. 
However, the Inquiry found that many of those disabled people with supposed lower level 
of needs have been affected not only by the move from DLA to PIP but also by changes 
made elsewhere in the benefit system (for example, reductions in housing benefit and the 
benefit cap) and by the closure of the Independent Living Fund. The cumulative impact of 
these changes was found to create vulnerabilities which the social security system should 
be seeking to alleviate. Taken as a whole, the Inquiry found that welfare reform has dispro-
portionally affected people with disabilities. Evidence was presented to indicate that many 
disabled people have seen a reduction in incomes, an increased dependency on informal 
and family care, increased stress and a reliance on discretionary services, including food 
banks (UN, 2016, p. 19).
The Inquiry found that information, advice and guidance for disabled people about 
their rights to disability benefits was limited or non-existent. Concerns were raised about 
information not being provided in appropriate formats and languages and that this causes 
unnecessary barriers to entitlement and often anxiety for potential claimants. The Inquiry 
made findings in relation to the mandatory reconsideration (MR) procedure, stating that 
this new process has curtailed access to first-tier tribunals. MR was introduced in April 
2013 for PIP and Universal Credit claims, and in October 2013 was extended to claims 
for all other DWP benefits (section 102 of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Universal 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
taf
fo
rd
sh
ire
 U
niv
ers
ity
], 
[R
ich
ard
 M
AC
HI
N]
 at
 13
:29
 26
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
14   R. MACHIN
Credit, PIP, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment Support Allowance (Decisions and 
Appeals) Regulations 2013). Before the introduction of MR claimants wishing to challenge 
a DWP decision could lodge an appeal directly with Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals 
Service (HMCTS) and pursue their appeal to an independent first-tier tribunal. The first-
tier tribunal (Social Security and Child Support) is responsible for hearing appeals against 
decisions relating to all DWP benefits. Under the MR process, claimants must ask the DWP 
to reconsider their decision during the ‘dispute period’ of one month. An appeal to the first-
tier tribunal can only be pursued once the DWP have issued a MR decision. There are no 
statutory time limits that stipulate how long the DWP should take to reconsider decisions 
under this process. The DWP (2013) stated that a new procedure for challenging benefit 
decisions was needed to ensure the earliest possible resolution of disputes and to reduce 
the burden on HMCTS. Amongst critics of the new system was His Honour Judge Robert 
Martin, formerly the President of Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. The 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2014) reported that he believed that 
the introduction of MR was a ‘dubious advantage’ as claimants now have to make two appli-
cations (MR and appeal to HMTCS) before an appeal is heard by a tribunal. Furthermore, 
he raised concerns that the reduced burdens on tribunals would be as a result of claimants 
not pursuing legitimate appeal cases as the system has become too onerous and convoluted.
The Inquiry noted that the government have made formal efforts to improve the image of 
disabled people but were concerned that recent policy developments have led to a negative 
portrayal of disabled benefit claimants in the media and that this has influenced public 
opinion. There is a growing body of academic evidence that analyses the above phenomenon: 
Garthwaite (2011) has analysed the language of ‘shirkers and scroungers’ finding parallels 
between recent depictions of disabled claimants with the classification of ‘deserving’ and 
‘underserving’ poor at the inception of the welfare state. She described the process of ‘oth-
ering’ where benefit claimants are often singled out as lazy, workshy or cheats. Roulstone 
(2015) believes that there are fundamental links between government policy and the way 
that disabled claimants are portrayed in the print and television media. Justifications for 
changes in policy are pushed through on the back of binary representations of people as 
being either ‘legitimate’ or ‘non-legitimate’ disabled people. He states that the classification 
of disability is often redefined in periods of financial uncertainty with ‘the use of media 
and cultural sources to back up the political project’ (Roulstone, 2015, p. 13). Perhaps most 
damagingly Roulstone identifies that current reforms to disability benefits use the language 
of independence to justify changes that in reality undermine the rights of disabled people.
As described earlier the PIP claimant journey was closely scrutinised by the Gray Review 
and the UN Inquiry also raised concerns about the experiences of claimants who ‘felt 
that they were merely processed rather than being listened to or understood’ (UN, 2016, 
p. 16). The Inquiry accepted that steps are being taken to improve PIP service delivery 
(in response to the Gray Review’s recommendations) but raised particular concerns that 
claimants requiring high levels of support, such as those with psychosocial difficulties, were 
not having their views and personal history properly accounted for by decision-makers. 
The concerns described in the section above by academics in the Disability Studies field 
that the PIP assessment process is closely aligned with the medical model of disability were 
shared by the Inquiry. Concerns were raised that there is a lack of focus on the support that 
people with disabilities need and the barriers that they face. The Inquiry concluded that the 
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government failed to carry out adequate equality impact assessments to assess the impact 
of the WRA 2012 and, therefore, failed to comply with domestic equality duties.
In light of the above findings, the Inquiry concluded that ‘there is reliable evidence that 
the threshold of grave or systematic violations of the rights of persons with disabilities 
has been met in the State party’ and that government policy has had an ‘adverse and dis-
proportionate effect on persons with disabilities’ (UN, 2016, p. 20). The Inquiry made 11 
recommendations, 5 of which are directly related to the administration of disability benefits:
•  The Inquiry recommended that the government should measure the impact of welfare 
reform on disabled people by carrying out a cumulative, human-rights-based equality 
impact assessment.
•  With direct links to the findings of the Gray Review, the Inquiry stated that the gov-
ernment should improve the administration of social security benefits and make the 
social security system more accessible for disabled people.
•  The government are urged to ensure that access to justice for disabled people is 
improved and appropriate legal advice and support is provided for disabled people 
seeking to challenge decisions.
•  It is recommended that the government take appropriate steps to consult with disabled 
people and their representatives to ‘give due consideration to their views in the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of any legislation, policy or programme 
action related to the rights addressed in the present report’ (UN, 2016, p. 21).
•  Finally, it was recommended that steps should be taken to challenge negative stere-
otypes about people with disabilities in the media and wider public with particular 
emphasis placed on the need to challenge the widely held perception that benefit 
dependency is, in itself, a disincentive to find work.
Government’s response to the Inquiry
The UK Government strongly disagreed with the findings of the UN Inquiry and did not 
accept that there is evidence of grave and systematic violations of the rights of disabled 
people (UK Government, 2016). In a robust defence of their record the government’s official 
response to the UN Inquiry cited a combination of legislative provision, official statistics 
and policy that they believed demonstrates a strong record of supporting disabled people.
In relation to PIP, the government reasserted its position that DLA was a flawed system 
that was in need of fundamental reform. It believed that there is an unnecessary retrospec-
tive focus on DLA as this was a benefit that did not meet the needs of disabled claimants or 
provide value for money. The government stated that a comparative exercise examining the 
relative merits of DLA and PIP is inappropriate and that rather than raising the threshold 
of eligibility PIP is better targeted to the needs of the current population.
The government cited statistics (DWP, 2016b) which it believed demonstrate the appro-
priateness of PIP but which also provided an interesting summary of the early progress of 
this benefit. A significant number of people who move from DLA to PIP receive a higher 
award, with 24% of PIP claimants receiving both components at the enhanced rate com-
pared to 15% of claimants who received the high rate of both components of DLA. The 
government argued that PIP provides a more equal footing for physical and mental health. 
As a result, 24% of PIP claimants with a mental health condition receive the enhanced rate 
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of the mobility component, compared to only 9% who received the high rate mobility DLA. 
Similarly, 66% of PIP claimants with mental health problems receive the enhanced rate of 
the daily living component compared to 22% for the DLA equivalent (UK Government, 
2016, p. 24). The government believed that in accepting many of the recommendations 
of the Gray Review they have effectively pre-empted some of the issues raised by the UN 
Inquiry. On the initially problematic issue of waiting times for a PIP decision the govern-
ment stated that this is now under control with an average wait of seven weeks for a decision 
(UK Government, 2016, p. 24). The government also claimed that communications with 
claimants has improved following a complete re-write of letters and other communication 
products.
An assessment of the strength and validity of the government’s response to the UN 
Inquiry ultimately brings us to fundamental questions about how disability should be cate-
gorised and the extent to which the state should support disabled claimants. The government 
pointed to statistics on social security expenditure which demonstrate a £50 billion spend 
per year on benefits to support people with disabilities, over £6 billion more than in 2010. 
Amounting to over 6% of expenditure the government believed that the UK compares 
favourably with the OECD average and countries such as Germany, France and the USA. 
This perhaps only provides a partial representation of the fiscal position as the IFS (2014) 
state that welfare reform is associated with ‘the largest real reductions in expenditure in 
history’. Hills (2015) emphasises that over the course of the coalition government’s period 
in office (2010–2015) working age people with lower incomes were net losers as a result 
of the full combination of benefit and tax credit changes. Many PIP claimants will fall into 
this category.
The government believed that the UN Inquiry had too narrow a scope and a focus on 
welfare reform neglected to acknowledge spending commitments in other areas which 
promote the rights of disabled people such as personal budgets and improved access to 
transport. Critics argue that the government’s record in supporting disabled people actually 
becomes far worse when a broader view is taken. Duffy (2013) argues that disabled people 
are particularly damaged by government cuts to benefits and local government, which 
account for over 50% of overall savings. The government’s response to the UN Inquiry 
emphasised that aggressive and/or discriminatory behaviour towards disabled people is 
unacceptable but made no reference to the role of the media in perpetuating stereotypes 
about disabled claimants.
Conclusion
In response to the Gray Review the government has made some changes to the assessment 
and adjudication processes of PIP, although the eligibility criteria remain unchanged. In spite 
of the criticisms of PIP made by the UN Inquiry on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
the short-term future of this disability benefit seems secure. In the longer term political, 
fiscal and legal factors will influence the level and assessment of this payment which is seen 
as essential for many disabled people. Reform of any social security benefit will rightly draw 
scrutiny and undoubtedly lead to criticism from some quarters. Harris (2015) has analysed 
the problems that can be associated with a complex social security system including lack 
of understanding by claimants, low take-up of benefits by those who may be entitled, high 
administration costs and administrative errors. However, he also identifies justifications 
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for complexity, for example, allowing for a high level of differentiation between similar 
claims and encouraging consistency. This article has demonstrated that these tensions are 
particularly pertinent to the administration of PIP and as Harris (2015, p. 218) states ‘Simple 
rules may be easier to administer but they are likely to offer a less sophisticated basis for 
responding to specific social problems and needs.’
The phrase ‘claimant journey’ has become part of the social security benefits lexicon but 
as this article has explored the direct experiences of a claimant are only one element of a 
longer and more complex process. The process begins with the setting of a government’s 
legislative programme. Once social security legislation is enacted practical adjudicating 
matters take hold and we can see how individual decision-making, and in the case of PIP, 
provision of evidence from a wide and often conflicting range of sources becomes the influ-
encing factor in determining benefit entitlement. The Gray Review justifiably focused on 
the role of private assessment providers. Many organisations who responded to the call for 
evidence argued that these companies exhibit a lack of accountability and quality control, 
while at the same time exerting a very significant level of influence over the decision-making 
process. In 2015/16 60% of PIP appeals heard at first-tier tribunal led to a reversal of the 
initial decision made by the DWP, with new oral or documentary evidence provided being 
the lead reason for 75% of these overturned decisions (Parliamentary written question 
37130, 2016). While this remains the case claimant representatives and first tier and upper 
tribunal social security judges will remain key players in holding the system to account. 
Section 94 of the WRA 2012 allows the Secretary of State to make incidental, supplementary 
or consequential changes to the benefits introduced under the welfare reform agenda. While 
a clear legislative path is available to make changes to PIP, this article has highlighted that 
making amendments to social security benefits is rarely a straightforward process.
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